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SHOULD CASINOS EXIST AS MONOPOLIES
OR SHOULD CASINOS BE IN
OPEN MARKETS?
William N. Thompson* & Catherine Prentice**
I. INTRODUCTION: DESCRIPTIONS—MONOPOLY, OLIGARCHY, OPEN MARKETS
This article examines how the different structures of casino industries
impact American states. It seeks to find whether monopolistic, oligopolistic,
and open competitive structures lead to different outcomes. The literature of
economics suggests that different outcomes are attached to varying industry
structures. Specifically, monopoly structures are adverse to the interests of the
consumers of their products.1 Accordingly, this article will test two hypotheses:
(l) whether monopoly casinos will offer artificially higher prices to customers,
and (2) whether monopoly casinos will offer their customers lower service
quality by using fewer employees and offering fewer amenities at their gaming
properties.
This article will categorize thirteen U.S. commercial casino jurisdictions
along a continuum from the most closed and monopolistic to the most open and
competitive jurisdictions. Specifically, this article will compare price points
and service attributes for the varying casino structures. This includes: slot
machine payout percentages, number of employees, and quantity of amenities,
such as number of hotel rooms, volume of convention space, number of restau-
rants, and number of entertainment venues. The relationship of these factors
will be analyzed to test the basic hypotheses presented above.
* William N. Thompson is Professor Emeritus of Public Administration at the University of
Nevada, Las Vegas. He received B.A. and M.A. degrees in Political Science from Michigan
State, and a Ph.D. from the University of Missouri-Columbia. Thompson served on the
faculties of SE Missouri State, Western Michigan Univ., and Troy State Univ. (Europe), and
he was as a guest research professor with the Macau Polytechnic Institute. He has published
numerous books and articles on gaming and gaming law. He has also worked as a consultant
for gaming companies, gaming administrators, and tribal gaming bodies. More information
on Thompson and his works can be found by accessing his website, www.billygamble.org.
** Catherine Prentice, Ph.D. Victoria University; Lecturer, Faculty of Business and
Enterprise, Swinburne University of Technology, Melbourne, Australia. She is a lecturer
with Swinburne University. She also served on the faculties of La Trobe University, Victoria
University, Monash University and Charles Sturt University. She is currently a committee
member of National Association for Gambling Studies and Asia Pacific Association for
Gambling Studies.
1 PAUL SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 116, 395 (9th ed. 1973); WALTER ADAMS & HORACE M.
GRAY, MONOPOLY IN AMERICA: THE GOVERNMENT AS PROMOTER 23 (1955); DAVID SCOTT,
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF BUSINESS TERMS 400-01 (2009); PETER COLLIN,
DICTIONARY OF BUSINESS 260 (2001); Monopoly, ECONOMICS ONLINE, http://www.econom-
icsonline.co.uk/Business_economics/Monopoly.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2013).
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II. DESCRIPTIONS—MONOPOLY, OLIGARCHY, OPEN MARKETS
The legalization of casinos has been a major policy issue in scores of
national and sub-national jurisdictions over the past 60 years. One of the criti-
cal issues is whether casino establishments should be licensed as singular enti-
ties (i.e., monopolies) in a specific location (e.g., city, state, or nation) like
public utilities, as opposed to licensed in an open free market competitive man-
ner. A middle ground approach finds jurisdictions allowing a limited number of
licenses, ergo, an oligopoly of casinos.2
A monopoly enterprise is one that serves its primary market (those
purchasing its products) without a competitor selling identical or similar ser-
vices or goods within the market.3 As a practical matter, all customers must
purchase the products from that enterprise if they desire to have the product.
There is no competition because the product sales are controlled by the single
enterprise.4
In an oligopoly, a few enterprises control the distribution of the service or
good to the market.5 Oligopolistic situations also arise if several producers
work together, or collude, to control the supply and price of the products they
sell.6 Such combinations of sellers may be called cartels.
With monopolies and oligopolies, the enterprises control the market. They
typically seek to maximize their profits by setting higher prices, which consum-
ers must pay if they want their products. These enterprises sometimes also use
practices that preclude other enterprises from coming into and competing in
that market. For example, oligopolies or monopolies may lower prices to levels
that others in the market cannot compete with. When their competitors go out
of business, they may raise prices considerably.7 Open markets occur where
there are a sufficiently large number of sellers of particular services or goods,
and no individual seller can set the prices for those services or goods.8
Monopolies may occur naturally or as a result of unfair competitive prac-
tices, also known as predatory practices, by larger enterprises in a market.9
Monopolies may also be authorized by governmental action.10 Certain indus-
tries require massive investments in facilities and equipment before they may
offer their products for sale. Examples include enterprises such as utility com-
2 James E. Roper & David M. Zin, Monopolies, Duopolies, and Oligarchies, in ENCYCLOPE-
DIA OF BUSINESS ETHICS AND SOCIETY 1401, 1404 (Robert W. Kolb ed., 2008). For a theo-
retical analysis of monopolies, see MARK S. MASSEL, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY 1-14
(1962); DONALD DEWEY, MONOPOLY IN ECONOMICS AND LAW (1959); Walter Adams, Pub-
lic Policy in a Free Enterprise Economy, in THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY 533-
63 (Walter Adams ed., 1982).
3 DEWEY, supra note 2, at 303-04. R
4 Id. 
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Roper & Zin, supra note 2, at 1401. R
10 Id.
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panies, like electric and water companies.11 There is sufficient financial risk in
these industries that investors need certainty of sales revenue, so they seek to
win a legal right to have monopoly status.12 The enterprise must find capital
suppliers to fund the start-up of their projects, yet banks and lenders will be
reluctant to fund massive projects if they do not have the certainty of monopoly
markets. Government licensing provides a needed economic security behind a
producer of a product—electricity or water—that is considered critical for the
public.13
When governments grant monopolies through licensing, they are aware of
the power they are granting to the enterprise. Therefore, governments exercise
regulatory power over the activities; specifically, the pricing of the products
offered by the monopoly. Yet even then, the risk may be too great for private
investors. Therefore, the government chooses to become the monopoly supplier
of the goods.14
On the other side of the equation, governments have set forth laws prohib-
iting the operation of monopolies and the exercise of predatory practices by
enterprises in most markets.15 The governmental authorities favor markets with
free competitive enterprises, because while monopolies may offer some advan-
tages, they usually offer severe disadvantages for society.16
The most notable advantage of a monopoly is the advantage of economies
of scale.17 By purchasing large quantities of raw materials for conversion into
its products, it can realize low input costs for its operations. In sales, economies
of scale can help an enterprise to avoid considerable costs required to advertise
products in competitive markets. By realizing higher profits, the monopoly has
the ability to invest in technological innovations that contribute to production
of higher quality products.18
On the other hand, history reveals that monopolies may do the opposite—
they may fight innovation. Rather than spending money on improving products,
monopolies transfer the money to profits. As long as they control the market,
they have no incentive for product improvements19 or improving their
workforce by offering higher salaries, providing training, or taking other steps
to improve worker motivation.20 Additionally, monopolies do not seek to
improve customer service because the threat of competition does not exist. Fur-
ther, they generally restrain production to achieve higher prices. By doing so,
11 SCOTT, supra note 1, at 231; ARTHUR WEIMER, INTRODUCTION TO BUSINESS: A MANAGE- R
MENT APPROACH 92 (1970); ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BUSINESS AND FINANCE 521 (Burton S. Kali-
ski ed., 2007).
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 WEIMER, supra note 11. R
16 SAMUELSON, supra note 1, at 520-29. R
17 See generally MASSEL, supra note 2, at 42-82. R
18 Potential Benefits from Monopoly, TUTOR2U, http://tutor2u.net/economics/content/topics/
monopoly/benefits_of_monopoly.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2013).
19 DEWEY, supra note 2, at 39-40. R
20 See Paul A. Geroski, Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Policy, in PERSPEC-
TIVES ON INNOVATION 457-58 (Franco Malerba & Stefano Brusoni eds., 2007); SAMUELSON,
supra note 1, at 498. R
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they introduce inefficiencies that are considered “dead weight losses” for
society.21
Furthermore, monopolies transfer wealth from unfortunate customers to
monopolists. With monopolies in place, competitors face overwhelming obsta-
cles; barriers to entry prevent competitors from competing for market share.22
Monopolies may also be adverse to the public interest because they give great
political power to companies, especially if they control critical products or if
they command economic power by providing large numbers of jobs and taxable
revenue.23
III. CASINO INDUSTRY STRUCTURES
After examining the structure of the casino industry in many jurisdictions,
one can see that there are few cases of open market competition. More often,
casino arrangements find structures of oligopoly with a few casinos dominating
a local market. Many more, perhaps even a majority of cases, involve casinos
operating as government-created monopolies.24 After we review and assess
available data on casino operations, this article will return to a vexing question:
Why would the government decree that a casino enterprise should operate as a
monopoly?
There seem to be surface answers, almost without need for independent
proofs and support, as to why society would monopolize and regulate an enter-
prise delivering electricity, natural gas supplies and water. These goods are
critical to the survival of a society. On the other hand, arguments that telephone
companies and television stations had to be monopolies or oligarchies are not
commonly made anymore.
Furthermore, there are arguments against the notion that governments
must have monopoly control over all operations of prisons, fire-fighting ser-
vices, and police forces.25 While few argue against the need for government
control over military forces, the U.S. Department of Energy has given a private
enterprise the function of providing essential security forces to guard the
United States’ arsenal of nuclear weapons at the Nevada Test Site.26 Does a
government-approved monopoly for providing casino gaming services make
sense? This question will be addressed later in the article.
21 Deadweight Loss, ECONMODEL, www.econmodel.com/classic/terms/deadweight_loss.
htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2013); Deadwight Loss Definition, INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www.
investopedia.com/terms/d/deadweightloss.asp (last visited Jan. 16, 2013).
22 SAMUELSON, supra note 1, at 502. R
23 See ADAMS, supra note 1, at I, vii-viii, 5. R
24 See 2 WILLIAM N. THOMPSON, THE INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GAMBLING 356-
598 (2010).
25 See Privatizing Police and Fire Departments, AMERICANLY YOURS, http://americanly
yours.com/2010/08/09/privatizing-police-and-fire-departments/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2013).
26 WSI NEVADA, www.wsinevada.com (last visited Jan. 16, 2013); Wakenhut—Nevada,
REAL POLICE, http://www.realpolice.net/forums/security-officers-loss-prevention-151/786
17-wackenhut-nevada-test-site.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2013).
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At the mid-point of the twentieth century, a small percentage of the juris-
dictions permitted casinos to exist anywhere within their boundaries.27 How-
ever, this number steadily increased. By 1986, 77 countries permitted casinos,
and by 1996 the number rose to 109.28 Now, over 132 (or 67.3%) of the 196
recognized nations have casinos.29 In the United States, only the state of
Nevada permitted casinos for the majority of the twentieth century. New Jersey
joined the list in 1978, and a decade later, a flood of new states began to jump
on the casino bandwagon with riverboat casinos, Native American casinos, and,
in a few cases, land-based casinos.30 Today, casinos of some kind are found in
38 states.31 In Canada, casinos have been authorized in seven of the ten prov-
inces, plus the Yukon Territory. In a majority of these jurisdictions, at least
some casinos operate as monopolies for their market region. Only a small num-
bers of casinos are in competitive local markets.32
While all business entities are subject to a myriad of legal rules and regu-
lations, casinos and other gaming enterprises must overcome a special hurdle
before they can offer services.33 Gaming establishments must be given special
grants of legality.34 In many jurisdictions it is presumed that gambling opera-
tions are illegal unless there are specific laws legalizing the operations or
exempting them from general prohibitions against gambling.35 The prohibitions
are in pages of state constitutional documents and court degrees.36 The busi-
nessman who wishes to bring a restaurant, a retail store, or a manufacturing
facility into a location, while faced with financial barriers and even regulatory
hoops, does not face the question facing the casino operator: is it legal?37
When casinos are given legal standing in a jurisdiction, lawmakers or citi-
zens voting to permit the casinos, rarely give blanket approval like voters did in
Nevada in 1931. Rather lawmakers are prone to designate the number of per-
mitted casinos and where they may be located.38
The political process leading up to legalization of casinos is usually a con-
tentious one accompanied by debate. However, that debate is almost entirely
consumed with a consideration of whether gambling is moral and whether it is
appropriate as a form of entertainment. Most critically, the debate focuses on
whether the casinos will produce considerable employment and tax revenue for
a jurisdiction.39 The debate rarely involves the merits of monopolies vis-a`-vis
27 William N. Thompson, Casinos de Juegos del Mundo: A Survey of World Gambling, 556
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 11, 13 (Mar. 1998).
28 Id.
29 Id.; see generally THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 355-598. R
30 See THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 518-98. R
31 See id.
32 See id.
33 See generally WILLIAM T. CHAMPION, JR. & I. NELSON ROSE, GAMING LAW IN A NUT-
SHELL (2012).
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id. 
37 See generally CHAMPION & ROSE, supra note 33.
38 For a list of venues, see Thompson, supra note 24, at 356-598. R
39 See JOHN DOMBRINK & WILLIAM N. THOMPSON, THE LAST RESORT: SUCCESS AND FAIL-
URE IN CAMPAIGNS FOR CASINOS 25-41, 176-77, 183-84 (1990).
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oligopolies and open market structures for the casino industry.40 Experts have
conducted little research on the varying industry structures’ effect on casino
industry performance, such as job development, growth and profits, tax reve-
nues and price structures.
Prior to presenting data and testing the hypotheses, this article will present
a historical development of casino structures in major gaming jurisdictions
including Monaco, Macau, and Nevada, as well as other jurisdictions in North
America and Asia. Vignettes will be offered for thirteen American jurisdictions
(plus one other) specifically used for the analysis.
IV. A LOOK AT CASINO JURISDICTIONS
Historically, most international jurisdictions authorized casinos as monop-
oly enterprises for the nation or for the local communities of a nation.41 This
was the pattern across Europe, epitomized by the establishment of a tourism
casino community in Monaco built around the state-controlled monopoly of
Monte Carlo casino facilities.42
A divergence from this traditional monopoly pattern was found in Macau,
a Portuguese colony along the south China coast. In Macau, private casinos
were licensed on a free competitive basis starting in 1847.43 However, to secure
better regulation and more guaranteed government revenues from the opera-
tions, a monopoly franchise was given to one company in 1934.44 The monop-
oly continued as a new company took control from 1962 until 2002, when it
was operating 11 casinos.45 In 1999, the Portuguese colonial regime ended as
Macau became a special region within China. In 2002, the new Chinese-con-
trolled regime issued three concessions, or licenses, for casino operators, each
of whom could have multiple casinos. The old monopoly operator, Stanley Ho,
retained one of the three licenses, while new licenses went to Las Vegas entre-
preneurs Sheldon Adelson (in conjunction with Lei Chi Woo of Hong Kong)
and Stephen Wynn.46 The new operators began opening casinos in 2004. Also
in 2004, each license holder was permitted to have a sub-license holder. Adel-
son and Woo separated into two companies: Ho sold a sublicense to an M.G.M.
partnership with his daughter Pansy Ho, and Wynn sold a sublicense to a part-
nership of Ho’s son Lawrence and James Packer of Australia.47
Now six companies hold licenses for multiple casinos48 in an open oligop-
oly that does not preclude new companies in the future. New companies may
secure portions of one of the three basic concessions and hold sublicenses. To
accomplish this, a new company would need to make purchases from Stanley
40 Id.
41 See THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 355-598; see INTERNATIONAL CASINO LAW (Anthony R
Cabot , William Thompson, Andrew Tottenham, and Carl Braunlich eds., 3d ed. 1999).
42 THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 455-57. R
43 ZHIDONG HAO, MACAU: HISTORY AND SOCIETY 75 (2011).
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.; William N. Thompson, Two Countries, One System: Las Vegas and Macau—Sharing
the Future, 16 GAMING L. REV. & ECON. 81, 84 (2012).
47 Id. 
48 The total number of casinos is 35.
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Ho, Adelson, Woo, or Wynn, and gain permission from Macau’s government
authorities.49 The dissolution of the monopoly structure in favor of a competi-
tive model resulted in considerable growth in the casino gaming market as evi-
denced by casino revenues from 2000 through 2011.50 Some of the phenomenal
growth in gaming revenues must be related to the fact that mainland China
began to allow its residents to go to Macau, albeit in a restricted manner, after
the jurisdiction was integrated with the Chinese nation in 1999. However, there
can be little doubt that revenues were driven by the creation of new competitive
casino properties among the largest casinos in the world.51
TABLE 1. GAMING REVENUES IN MACAU: THE END OF A MONOPOLY
AND PROSPERITY52
Year Number of Casinos Revenue
2000 11 $2.0 billion
2001 11 $2.4 billion
2002 11 $2.8 billion
2003 11 $3.6 billion
2004 15 $5.2 billion
2005 17 $5.6 billion
2006 24 $7.1 billion
2007 28 $10.4 billion
2008 31 $13.6 billion
2009 33 $14.9 billion
2010 33 $23.5 billion
2011 34 $33.5 billion
Former monopoly holder, Stanley Ho, was not happy about sharing his
business. In several press statements he lamented that: “We are Chinese. We
should unite against foreign capital. We cannot keep silent. If not the foreign
capital will bury us.”53 His prognostication was way off target. In 2003, before
competitive operators opened their doors, Mr. Ho’s premier casino was the 11-
story Lisboa. At the time, his eleven properties realized revenues of $3.6 bil-
lion. He began a building spree, and by 2010, he had 20 casinos, with his
flagship casino being the new 57 story high Grand Lisboa. His revenues rose to
$6.4 billion. He had lost market share, dropping from 100% to 27%, but his
gaming profits had risen 80%—a respectable trade-off for losing a monopoly.54
49 Id.
50 Macau Gaming Summary, UNLV CENTER FOR GAMING RESEARCH, http://gaming.unlv.
edu/abstract/macau.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2013).
51 See Thompson, supra note 46. R
52 Macau Gaming Summary, supra note 50. R
53 Adelson Worries Ho’s Words Could Hurt Venetian, MACAU NEWS ONLINE TODAY (Mar.
10, 2009, 3:16 PM), http://macau-news.blogspot.com/2009/03/adelson-worries-hos-words-
could-hurt.html; see HAO, supra note 43, at 74. R
54 Adelson, supra note 53. R
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As casino development swept Europe in the later nineteenth century and
over throughout the twentieth century, the monopoly pattern prevailed in Ger-
many, France, Spain, Portugal, Netherlands, Italy and other countries.55 Great
Britain broke the pattern to a degree by allowing oligopolies of small casinos in
some major cities (e.g., 20 in London and 6 in Birmingham), but in most cities
where casinos are permitted, only one casino has been licensed.56
In the United States, Nevada provided a model in which any business
wishing to operate a casino could apply for a license under the state’s 1931
legislation.57 Very few restrictions were placed on license applicants. As casi-
nos grew and became a major tourist attraction, especially around Las Vegas,
licensing simply meant establishing credentials of integrity and some financial
ability.58 Even as mobsters came from other states where they had operated
casinos illegally and began operations in Las Vegas, these people made a pri-
vate decision that all applicants for casino licenses would be welcome in Las
Vegas, and that there would be no monopoly control over the casinos by the
mob or any branch, ergo “family” of organized crime.59
New Jersey legalized casinos for Atlantic City in 1976. There was no set
number of casino licenses, and since 1978, 13 casinos have been licensed. No
company was allowed to have more than three facilities.60
After the legalization of casinos in New Jersey, pressure mounted for casi-
nos elsewhere. Beginning in 1989, several states embraced the notion of
allowing either a single casino (a monopoly) or permitting only a few casinos
(an oligopoly) in communities along major rivers in the state or bordering the
state.61 Only Mississippi’s boat casinos were in competitive market places.62 In
1988 and 1989, two western states allowed casinos in selected mountain areas
with limited betting and competition among facilities.63 Tribal casinos began to
emerge in multiple states in 1989 as well. The 1990s brought more than 100
new tribal casinos. Almost all tribal casinos operated as local monopolies.64 In
1996, the state of Michigan authorized an oligopoly of three commercial casi-
nos for Detroit.65
The debate rages on, but local monopolies and limited oligopolies seem to
reign supreme. In 2006, Pennsylvania permitted 14 monopoly casinos in scat-
tered cities, albeit Philadelphia and Pittsburgh had a few dispersed casino loca-
tions.66 In 2011, Massachusetts granted monopoly licenses to four casinos.67
55 See generally Thompson, supra note 27. R
56 INTERNATIONAL CASINO LAW, supra note 41, at 323-480. R
57 THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 555. R
58 See generally JEFF BURBANK, LICENSE TO STEAL: NEVADA’S GAMING CONTROL SYSTEM
IN THE MEGARESORT AGE 1-34 (2000).
59 Interview with Jack Binion, former owner, Horseshoe Casino, in Las Vegas, Nev. (Sept.
20, 2004); see also THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 560-63, 570. R
60 See generally THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 584-86. R
61 See INTERNATIONAL CASINO LAW, supra note 41, at 27, 33, 39-42, 92. R
62 See generally THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 548-50; see also INTERNATIONAL CASINO R
LAW, supra note 41, at 72-91. R
63 THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 524-25, 589-90. R
64 1 WILLIAM N. THOMPSON, THE INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GAMBLING 139-51
(2010).
65 THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 546-47. R
66 Id. at 584-86.
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Similarly, Florida has been considering a monopoly structure for new commer-
cial casinos.68
While some in Nevada may have worried about the new competition
across the United States, like Stanley Ho did in Macau, the impacts on the
former monopoly jurisdiction were similar to the impacts on Nevada.69
TABLE 2. NEVADA SURVIVES AS CASINO GAMING SWEEPS THE
UNITED STATES70
States with Non-Nevada Non-Nevada Nevada Las Vegas
Year Casinos Casinos Revenue Revenue Revenue
1989 7 53 $2.8 billion $5.0 billion $3.4 billion
1990 7 115 $3.6 billion $5.5 billion $4.1 billion
1995 17 300 $14.7 billion $7.6 billion $5.7 billion
2000 27 384 $24.8 billion $9.3 billion $7.7 billion
2005 36 861 $52.6 billion $10.7 billion $9.7 billion
2010 37 935 $61.3 billion $9.9 billion $8.9 billion
From 1989 to 2010, the number of states with casino gaming expanded
from 8 to 38, including Nevada. Outside Nevada, the number of casinos
expanded from 53 in 1989 to 935 in 2010, and casino revenues went from $2.8
billion to $61.3 billion. Nevada casinos were in constant competition, but the
casinos in new jurisdictions did not destroy the Nevada industry. On the con-
trary, as new casinos appeared across the nation, revenues flourished and new
casinos were developed in Nevada as well. Indeed, for each new casino outside
Nevada, Nevada gaming revenue increased $5,555,555 per year and Las Vegas
gaming revenue increased $6,235,828 per year.71 Certainly, market share was
lost for Nevada, but profits increased.
Canadian provinces embraced casino gaming in the 1970s by tying it to
charities or to government lottery schemes.72 In 1969, national legislation
opened the door for lotteries and such “schemes.” Major government-owned
monopoly casinos were created in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Ontario, Quebec,
Nova Scotia, and the Yukon Territory.73 Charity casinos appeared within a
67 Howard Stutz, Key Moment in Florida, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Feb. 5, 2012, at 1D; Jeanette
DeForge, Casino Proposal May Help Prompt New Study of Traffic Problems on Chicopee’s
Burnett Road, MASSLIVE.COM (Aug. l, 2012, 1:39 PM) http://www.masslive.com/news/
index.ssf/2012/08/casino_proposals_create_a_new.html.
68 Id.
69 See the statistics in Table 2, showing that as casino gaming expanded across the United
States, so too did the gaming revenues in Nevada and Las Vegas.
70 William Thompson, Casinos in Las Vegas: Where Impacts Are Not the Issue, in
LEGALIZED CASINO GAMING IN THE UNITED STATES: THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACT
105 (Cathy Hsu ed., 1999); for the years indicated on Table 2, the data was collected from
AMERICAN GAMING ASSOCIATION, STATE OF THE STATES (1999-2010), and NEVADA GAMING
CONTROL BOARD, NEVADA GAMING ABSTRACT REPORTS (1990-2010).
71 Figures are calculated from data on Table 2.
72 THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 386-88. R
73 See id. at 388-404.
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competitive market structure in Alberta and British Columbia and jurisdictions
with government casinos.74
In the 1970s, the Australian state of Tasmania opened its first casino in
Hobart.75 A second opened in Launceston in 1982.76 The 1980s and 1990s saw
monopoly casinos in the other jurisdictions. Casino monopolies existed in Vic-
toria, South Australia, West Australia, New South Wales, The Capital Terri-
tory, while Queensland had four monopoly casinos. Queensland’s casinos were
located in the widely separated cities of Brisbane, Gold Coast, Cairnes, and
Townsville.77 The Northern Territory had two monopoly casinos in towns over
900 miles apart—Darwin and Alice Springs.78 New Zealand authorized four
casinos in the 1990s as well.79
Singapore created a shared monopoly by authorizing two mega-casinos.80
As this article goes to publishing, Japan continues to debate legalization with
the main proposal permitting ten monopoly casinos in select cities.81 These two
new casino jurisdictions have latched onto the concept of the integrated resort,
with each casino attached to a full resort complex.82 Local monopoly casinos
are also found in the Philippines, Korea, and Malaysia, while Vietnam has a
casino oligopoly in Ho Chi Minh City.83
Vignettes describing selected jurisdictions can illustrate the impact of
casino structures on the gaming economy. The descriptive paragraphs can also
aid in categorizing American jurisdictions on a continuum from the most
monopolistic to the least.
V. VIGNETTES AND DESCRIPTIONS OF CASINO INDUSTRY STRUCTURES IN
AMERICAN STATE JURISDICTIONS84
A. Colorado: In Three Mountain Towns by Accidental Design
In 1990, Colorado voters approved “limited” casinos for three remote
mountain towns: Central City, Blackhawk, which are twin towns about 30
miles from Denver, and Cripple Creek, a historic town 50 miles from Colorado
Springs.85 These three towns were chosen after some entrepreneurs came up
with the idea. They asked business leaders in small towns in Colorado whether
74 Id. at 388, 390.
75 Id. at 383.
76 Id.
77 See id. at 382-84.
78 Id.
79 See id. at 384-85; INTERNATIONAL CASINO LAW, supra note 41, at 590. R
80 THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 380. R
81 Interview with Ichiro Tanioka, Professor of Sociology, Head of Gaming Inst., & Presi-
dent, Osaka Univ. of Commerce, in Tokyo, Japan (Nov. 4, 2011).
82 For more background on integrated resorts, see generally INTEGRATED RESORT CASINOS
(William R. Eadington & Meighan R. Doyle eds., 2009).
83 THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 370, 375, 378-79. R
84 See generally id. at 524-96; see also Richard Nathan, Colorado, in INTERNATIONAL
CASINO LAW, supra note 41, at 17-153; WILLIAM N. THOMPSON, INTERNATIONAL CASINO R
LAW AND REGULATION (International Masters of Gaming Law, 2008-2012).
85 THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 524. R
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they would help finance the campaign.86 Three towns said “yes” and the legis-
lature limited casinos to only those three towns.87 Each city could have as
many casinos as could secure licenses.88 However, the casinos could only offer
blackjack, poker, and slot machines.89 The maximum single bet in a game was
$5. This limit has since been increased to $100.90 The state gaming board was
empowered to license the casinos and to set annual taxes for gaming.91
Beginning in 1991, over eighty casinos obtained licenses and opened.92
The market was immediately saturated, but within a year, over 20 casinos
closed their doors.93 Colorado exacerbated the casinos’ economic struggles by
doubling taxes from ten percent to twenty percent for the second year of opera-
tions.94 Few new applicants sought licenses. There are now 48 active casinos.95
Because each casino had to be located within a building with another business,
the town became saturated with souvenir shops offering gaming. Instead of
economic growth, the towns experienced traffic jams and accident rates on their
few winding mountain roads commonly caused by drunk driving.96
B. Illinois: Let’s Put the Casinos by the Poor People – Let’s Help Them
out a bit!
Illinois did not intend to create windfall profits for casinos when the legis-
lature passed its gaming law in January 1990.97 Its goals were much more
benign. Legislators were seeking much needed tax revenue for the state coffers
and economic development for its poorest communities.98 The economic devel-
opment was focused toward the economically depressed communities, such as
East St. Louis, Joliet, Peoria, Rock Island and Galena.99 New casinos in these
communities would attract tourists from long distances and create jobs for
unemployed local residents.100 The new tourism would also help local
merchants expand their businesses.101 Thus, ten riverboat casinos were author-
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.; Nathan, supra note 84, at 20-21. R
89 THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 524. R
90 Id. at 525.
91 Nathan, supra note 84, at 19; R. Keith Schwer & William N. Thompson, Predicting the R
Selection of Gaming Taxation: A Cross-Section Model, National Training Conference of the
American Society of Public Administration (July 26, 1994).
92 Nathan, supra note 84, at 18. R
93 Id.
94 Id. at 23-24.
95 Colorado Casino List, WORLD CASINO DIRECTORY, www.worldcasinodirectory.com/col-
orado/casino-list (last visited Jan. 16, 2013).
96 See Patricia A. Stokowski, Crime Patterns and Gaming Development in Rural Colorado,
34 J. TRAVEL RES. 63, 66 (1996).
97 See Michael Ficaro, Illinois, in INTERNATIONAL CASINO LAW, supra note 41, at 27-29. R
98 William N. Thompson & Ricardo Gazel, The Economic Impact of Riverboat Gambling in
Illinois, (Better Gov’t Ass’n, Working Paper, June 11, 1996) (on file with author).
99 Id.
100 Terrence Brunner, Executive Dir., Better Gov’t Ass’n, Statement to the Metro Ethics
Coalition Project (June 23, 1997), available at http://www.lwvma.org/Casino%20Gambling
%20Resource%20PDF%20Files/02%20Statement%20to%20the%20Metro%20Ethics%20
Coalition%20Project.pdf.
101 Id.
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ized for the entire state, located in depressed communities on major
waterways.102
To assure that there would not be windfall profits, each casino boat was
limited to 1,200 gaming positions, which included slot machines and seats at
gaming tables.103 During gaming hours, the boats would have to be cruising on
open waters.104 Gaming would stop when the boats dock to let players off or to
let new players on board.105 The boats were in depressed communities, and as
such, most of the gamblers were from poorer communities.106 With the excep-
tion of Joliet, the casino communities each had a monopoly consisting of one
boat.107 While the casino locations108 were largely isolated from each other,109
the East St. Louis casino shared the immediate local region with four St. Louis
Missouri area casinos110 and other casinos shared markets with Iowa and Indi-
ana casinos.111
Illinois’ hopes that the casinos would attract customers from long dis-
tances and that customers’ spending would create local jobs was a pipe
dream.112 However, nearby local populations furnished sufficient players to fill
the allotted gaming spots in each casino.113 By limiting the size of each boat,
the authorities created a situation in which the casinos did not have to adver-
tise.114 They certainly did not have to build hotel rooms for the customers.115
One survey found that 54% of the players lived within 25 miles of the
casino they visited and 86% lived in Illinois—even though five of the ten casi-
nos were on rivers that shared state boundaries with Iowa, Missouri, or Ken-
tucky.116 Only 17 out of 740 players interviewed (2.3%) stayed at a hotel or
motel, and several of these players were not visiting the area to go to the casi-
nos. Rather than bringing money into the community, a preponderance of the
players was spending money at the casinos that they would have otherwise
spent in the community.117
The limit on the number of casinos and the restrictions on the size of
gaming areas precluded expansion of the casino business and kept the proper-
ties from advertising to potential tourists. The Chicago Better Business Bureau
102 THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 533. R
103 See Ficaro, supra note 97, at 29. R
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 WILLIAM N. THOMPSON & RICARDO GAZEL, BETTER GOV’T ASS’N, GAMBLERS IN ILLI-
NOIS: WHO ARE THEY? (April 1996).
107 Ficaro, supra note 97, at 27-28. R
108 Listed above, in addition to, Elgin, Aurora, Metropolis, Alton.
109 Id.
110 See THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 550-51; S. Maxwell et al., Missouri, in INTERNA- R
TIONAL CASINO LAW, supra note 41, at 92. R
111 THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 535-37; Lorenzo D. Creighton, Iowa, in INTERNATIONAL R
CASINO LAW, supra note 41, 39-41. R
112 Thompson & Gazel, supra note 98. R
113 Thompson & Gazel, supra note 98; THOMPSON & GAZEL, supra note 106. R
114 Thompson & Gazel, supra note 98; THOMPSON & GAZEL, supra note 106. R
115 Thompson & Gazel, supra note 98; THOMPSON & GAZEL, supra note 106. R
116 THOMPSON & GAZEL, supra note 106. R
117 Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVG\4-1\NVG103.txt unknown Seq: 13 30-APR-13 11:53
Spring 2013] SHOULD CASINOS EXIST AS MONOPOLIES 51
sent a survey team to visit 100 local businesses in Joliet, Illinois.118 They sur-
veyors asked whether the introduction of two casinos (with four riverboats) into
Joliet helped or hurt their businesses. If the business owner indicated that the
casinos helped his business, the surveyors asked how it helped. Approximately
one half of the businesses said that they had seen no effect on their business,
while the other half found that their business had suffered with the introduction
of casino gaming.
However, two business leaders asserted that business had never been bet-
ter. “Thank god for the casinos,” they glowed.119 One of the businesses pur-
chased used cars for cash. It realized great turn-over profits because of the
steady supply of cars offered by owners for sale at fast and low prices. The
other business was a travel agency. The survey team thought the travel
agency’s business increase demonstrated the benefits of tourism coming to
Joliet because of the casinos. However, the director of the travel agency
responded to this suggestion with laughter. “No. No. You don’t understand, our
many new clients are not people who have chosen to come to Joliet. They are
people who live in Joliet. Since the casino doors have opened, they have rushed
our doors, seeking our services. They are booking flights to Las Vegas.” Joliet
casinos certainly did affect tourism.
C. Indiana: Following the Neighbor, But Bigger
The governor of Indiana vetoed legislation to allow riverboat casinos in
his state. However, on July 1, 1993, the legislature overrode his veto.120 In
December 1995, the first of eleven casino boats opened its doors.121 Currently,
five permanently docked boats operate along the shores of Lake Michigan.122
Three boats constitute an oligopoly in southeast Indiana operating within the
Cincinnati, Ohio metropolitan area.123 There is a single monopoly boat on the
Ohio River north of Louisville, and another on the Ohio River in Evansville.
The eleventh boat is on a southern Indiana lake by French Lick.124
In 1997, researcher and coauthor of this paper, William N. Thompson was
hired by the Horseshoe Casino Company125 to analyze the economic impacts
for a proposed casino river boat seeking a license for a location near Louis-
ville.126 Only one license was available. Mr. Thompson intended to show how
118 Brunner, supra note 100. Coauthor Thompson and Ricardo Gazel assisted Terrence R
Brunner in developing and analyzing the Joliet business survey in 1986.
119 Id.
120 Carl Braunlich, Indiana, in INTERNATIONAL CASINO LAW, supra note 41, at 33. R
121 THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 536. R
122 Braunlich, supra note 120, at 33. R
123 See THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 536. R
124 See Indiana, WORLD CASINO DIRECTORY, http://www.worldcasinodirectory.com/Indiana
(last visited Jan. 16, 2013); see also CASINO CITY’S GAMING BUSINESS DIRECTORY 61 (Win-
ter 2012).
125 Coauthor, William Thompson, was engaged to analyze the economic impacts for a pro-
posed casino riverboat near Louisville. Thompson sought to show how the boat could result
in an overall economic benefit for the entire Louisville metropolitan region. The political
information in the paragraph was gathered during his direct observations while on personal
visits to Indiana on behalf of the Horseshoe Casino.
126 Id.
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the casino boat could lead to economic benefit for the entire Louisville metro-
politan region. However, the Horseshoe Casino Company emphasized to the
researcher that the state of Indiana was more concerned about how many jobs
the boat would generate and how much tax revenue the boat would provide for
Indiana.
In a sense, greater tax revenues for Indiana would be adverse to economic
benefits for the region. Neither southern Indiana nor the Louisville area would
benefit because the taxes would go to a government hundreds of miles away in
central Indiana. Back to the drawing table, Mr. Thompson minimized the size
of a hotel, reduced the number of restaurants and showroom activities, and
added additional gaming area to the equation.127 The changed analysis pro-
jected increased tax revenues, but the bottom line remained the same. Then, the
Horseshoe Casino Company hired the former lieutenant governor to lobby their
proposal.128 A rival company hired a former governor and proposed a bigger
boat with a bigger casino and more projected tax revenue. The rival company
secured the license.129
D. Iowa: The Original Image, Crap Shooting With Huckleberry Finn
Iowa was the first state to put casino boats on water. Riverboat gaming
was approved in 1989, and casino activity began in Iowa in 1991.130 The state
has licensed fifteen—casino boats and three racetrack casinos.131 New casinos
are permitted, but local jurisdictions must approve their presence.132 Along
with three Native American casinos, most of the facilities stand as local
monopolies, except for three casinos in the Council Bluffs area and four in the
Davenport area.133 Originally, patrons were limited to a $200 loss for each
cruising session, and patrons were not allowed to have a single bet of more than
$5.134 These limits have since been removed.135
E. Louisiana: Boats and The Blues
In 1992, Louisiana law authorized one land-based casino in New Orleans
and 15 riverboat casinos.136 Under the law, racetracks, truck stops, and bars are
also authorized to have slot machines.137 Advertising is strictly limited.138 The
New Orleans casino is designed to cater to tourist traffic, but it is not permitted
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.; Braunlich, supra note 120. R
130 Lorenzo D. Creighton, Iowa, in INTERNATIONAL CASINO LAW, supra note 41, 39-41. R
131 THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 537; Iowa, WORLD CASINO DIRECTORY, http://www.world R
casinodirectory.com/iowa (last visited Feb. 12, 2013). Not all the 18 listed casinos are
operational.
132 Creighton, supra note 130; see also Current News and Information, IOWA RACING AND R
GAMING COMM’N, www.iowa.gov/irgc.
133 Id.
134 THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 537; Current News and Information, IOWA RACING AND R
GAMING COMM’N, www.iowa.gov/irgc.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 541-42.
137 Id.
138 H. Buchler et al., Louisiana, in INTERNATIONAL CASINO LAW, supra note 41, at 57. R
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVG\4-1\NVG103.txt unknown Seq: 15 30-APR-13 11:53
Spring 2013] SHOULD CASINOS EXIST AS MONOPOLIES 53
to have a hotel, a sit-down restaurant or cafe´, or live entertainment so as to not
compete with existing entertainment venues in the city.139 Initially, the law
imposed a tax of 18.5% on gaming above the required annual fee of $100 mil-
lion.140 The annual fee was later reduced to $50 million.141
Presently, five of the riverboat casinos are in the New Orleans metropoli-
tan area, five are in the Shreveport-Bossier City area, three are in Baton Rouge,
and two are in Lake Charles.142 There are also three Native American casinos
in the state.143
F. Michigan: To Stop Gaming Dollars Going Over the Bridge
Voters in Detroit had several opportunities to approve advisory referenda
on casinos. They voted against the referenda in 1976, 1981, 1988, and 1993.144
However, shortly after the 1993 vote, the governor of Michigan approved
casino compacts for seven Native American tribes.145 Then on May 17, 1994,
the government of Ontario, Canada opened a casino in Windsor, just one mile
over the Detroit River’s Ambassador Bridge from downtown Detroit.146 Detroit
voters could see the constant line of traffic over the bridge taking Detroit (and
other Michigan) dollars across the international boundary to a foreign
casino.147 As such, in November 1994, they approved an advisory vote calling
for the legalization of casinos in Detroit.148 Legalization, however, required a
change in the Michigan constitution.149
The authors of the 1994 advisory proposal instituted a petition drive for a
statewide vote to amend the state constitution to allow Detroit to have three
casinos.150 The proposition was put on the state ballot in 1996, but it contained
a lot of fine print that was not in the summary on the ballot.151 Voters approved
the proposal by less than 52%; however, they only saw that Detroit would have
three casinos and that taxes would go to the state and the city of Detroit for
good causes.152 The voters had also inadvertently approved the fine print,
which stated that two casino licenses had to go to the two companies that sup-
ported the 1994 referendum campaign.153
One sponsor, the Atwater Group, combined with Circus Circus Casinos to
secure the first license, even though most of the principals at Atwater were
139 Id. 58-59.
140 THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 542; H. Buchler et al., supra note 138. R
141 THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 542. R
142 Id. at 541.
143 Id.
144 Fred Wacker & William N. Thompson, Michigan, in INTERNATIONAL CASINO LAW,
supra note 41, at 64. R
145 Id. at 65. There are now twenty tribal casinos — all well outside of the Detroit Metro-
politan area.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 64.
149 For a history, see William N. Thompson & R. Fred Wacker, The Michigan Question: A
Legal Quandary, 1 GAMING L. REV. 501, 501 (1997).
150 Id. at 506; Wacker & Thompson, supra note 144, at 66. R
151 Thompson & Wacker, supra note 149; Wacker & Thompson, supra note 144, at 66. R
152 Thompson & Wacker, supra note 149; Wacker & Thompson, supra note 144, at 66. R
153 Thompson & Wacker, supra note 149, at 507. R
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found unsuitable for licensing.154 Greektown, another 1994 sponsor, combined
with a northern Michigan Native American tribe and obtained the second
license.155 In competition with eight other non-1994 sponsors, M.G.M Grand
obtained the third license.156 Each of the three companies found existing
properties in decaying downtown Detroit and constructed appropriately large
parking garages and interior casino floor areas.157 Although promises of com-
pleting hotel structures were delayed for over six years, gaming began in
1999.158 The casinos were full, but almost all of the players were from the local
Detroit area.159 Casino sponsors assured Michigan voters that the volume of
business at Casino Windsor would decline after the three Detroit casinos
opened. This did not happen, however.160 The Canadian authorities approved a
second casino in Windsor and added nearly one thousand slot machines to the
racetrack facilities in Windsor.161 Casino Windsor constructed 390 hotel rooms
after the Michigan legalization, and later they approved a $90 million expan-
sion with an additional 200 hotel rooms.162
G. Missouri: Regulation or Grabbing for the Big Dollar Sign
Missouri riverboat casinos were first licensed in 1993 and began full-scale
operations in 1994.163 At first, players had a $500 loss limit during each cruis-
ing session.164 Later the limit was dropped.165 Initially, riverboat casinos were
allowed in any county where voters had approved gaming.166 In 2008, the state
imposed a limit of thirteen riverboat casino licenses.167
In the early stages, the state was eager to find operators and it tended to
overlook factors that may have disqualified certain applications. Casino appli-
cants hired local attorneys who used what some considered inappropriate influ-
ence over regulators to secure licensing. One such applicant was a major
Nevada firm, Station Casinos, Inc. (“Station”).168 Station won approval for
licenses in Kansas City and in St. Charles in 1997. However, the operations did
154 Wacker & Thompson, supra note 144, at 68-69. R
155 Id. 
156 THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 546. R
157 Id.; this is also a personal observation of coauthor Thompson, formerly a resident of the
Detroit area.
158 For background on the process, see Cameron McWhirter & Darren A. Nichols, Casino
Plan Downsized – Kilpatrick Seeks License Extension; Latest Plan Envisions Smaller
Hotels, Less Revenue, DETROIT NEWS, Mar. 21, 2002, at 01A.
159 See Mike Tobin, Detroit Casinos Lacking Benifits [sic] for City, Cleveland Plain Dealer,
Apr. 14, 2005, reprinted by AM. POL’Y ROUNDTABLE, http://www.aproundtable.org/news/
newsindividual.cfm?news_ID=340&issuecode=casino (last visited Mar.20, 2013).
160 See THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 399. R
161 Id.
162 Casino Windsor Plans $400 Million Expansion, CASINO CITY TIMES (Feb. 21-27, 2005),
http://newsletter.casinocity.com/Issue232.
163 S. Maxwell et al., Missouri, in INTERNATIONAL CASINO LAW, supra note 41, at 92. R
164 See id. at 94.
165 THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 551. R
166 Maxwell et al., supra note 163. R
167 Scott Franks, Missouri Casinos, USA TODAY TRAVEL, http://traveltips.usatoday.com/
missouri-casinos-19991.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2013).
168 Stations to Sell Missouri Operations, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2000, at C4.
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not meet all state standards. Station was fined over one million dollars for
activities such as accepting wagers from persons as young as thirteen years
old.169 Nonetheless, rather than revoking Station’s license causing the company
to lose their entire investment, the Missouri gaming authorities permitted Sta-
tion to sell its casino interests to Ameristar Casinos.
After this decision, the state determined there would be a permanent oli-
gopoly with only thirteen casinos. State regulators created a retroactive regula-
tory standard that restricted the size of casino operations.170 They revoked a
license from the President Casino, which was one of Missouri’s first with a
boat underneath the Arch in St. Louis.171 While the boat was making profits,
the profits were not sufficient to satisfy the Missouri Gaming Commission.172
Commission members also feared that the boat was in a state of decay and its
owners were not prepared to upgrade it.173 A new license was awarded to a
casino in Cape Girardeau which promised to bring in greater revenues.174
H. Mississippi: From the Coast to a Ditch, to the Shore
After Nevada, Mississippi comes the closest to offering an open market
for casinos.175 There are 32 casinos in Mississippi, and like Nevada, casinos
came to Mississippi in an almost natural progression from an existing reality to
a licensed phenomenon.176 Several ships offered “cruises to nowhere” from
ports in Mississippi.177 There was a debate over whether the ships could offer
games while in the waters of the Mississippi Sound inside a line of outer
islands in the Gulf of Mexico.178 The courts and the legislature wrestled with
the issue.179 After several attempts, the legislature permitted one ship to operate
games during “cruises to nowhere.”180 However, the ship was not sufficiently
profitable and it ceased operations.181
During the debate, the legislature witnessed the legalization of riverboat
casinos in Iowa and Illinois.182 In the summer of 1990, the legislature also
approved casino boats for ports on the Gulf of Mexico and along navigable
areas of the Mississippi River.183 The licenses, however, did not require that
169 Id.
170 Kelsey Volkmann, President Casino, Admiral to Disappear from Riverfront by July, ST.
LOUIS BUS. J. (Mar. 10, 2010), http://www.bizjournals.com/stlouis/stories/2010/03/08/daily
42.html?page=all.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Melissa Miller, Cape Gireadeau Casino Opens for Business, SOUTHEAST MISSOURIAN
(Oct. 31, 2012), http://www.semissourian.com/story/1908830.html
175 See generally THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 548. R
176 Id.; see also T.B. Shepherd & C.L. Netz, Mississippi, in INTERNATIONAL CASINO LAW,
supra note 41, at 72-73. R
177 Shepherd & Netz, supra note 176, at 72. R
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 Id.; THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 549. R
182 Shepherd & Netz, supra note 176, at 73; THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 549. R
183 Shepherd & Netz, supra note 176, at 73; THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 549. R
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boats make cruises, only that the gaming areas were above water.184 Each
casino boat became a permanent structure.185 The casino floor was essentially a
barge; although, it only moved up and down with changes in river levels.186
After Hurricane Katrina devastated the Gulf Coast and the surrounding casinos
in 2005, Mississippi allowed rebuilding on solid ground within 800 yards of the
Gulf.187 Mississippi now has three casinos in Gulfport-Bay St. Louis, nine in
Biloxi along the Gulf Coast, eleven near Tunica in the north within an hour of
Memphis, and eight along the River in Greenville, Vicksburg, and Natchez.188
There is also one Native American casino.189
Moreover, the Mississippi licensing process is open. The only restriction is
that the location of the casino boats must be in river or Gulf water counties
where voters approved gaming.190 However, in 1996, the Casino board rejected
a license for a fifth boat in Vicksburg because the boat would increase competi-
tion with the existing Vicksburg boats.191 In 2012, a license application for a
new casino on the Gulf Coast was upheld so architects could redesign the facil-
ity to accommodate a much larger gaming floor.192
I. Nevada: The Reigning American Title Holder
Nevada has an open licensing process with over 300 casinos and 2,000
restricted gaming locations, which have only a small number of slot machines
(15 or under).193 Gaming is permitted in all counties and cities except Boulder
City. Until 1960, Boulder City was controlled by the federal government—the
city had been established as a residential area for workers on the massive Hoo-
ver Dam.194 While casino gaming was legalized in 1931, it did not become the
state’s dominating industry for a dozen years after that.195 In the 1940s, opera-
tors of illegal casino establishments from across the United States gravitated to
Nevada to set up shop where it was legal. Prominent among them were mem-
bers of organized crime families. These “mobsters” met together and made a
critical decision: Las Vegas (and Nevada) would welcome anyone who wished
to come and start a casino.196 They did not have to be members of this crime
family, that crime family, or any crime family at all. From the start, the casino
184 Shepherd & Netz, supra note 176, at 73. R
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 550. R
188 See Mississippi, WORLD CASINO DIRECTORY, http://www.worldcasinodirectory.com/
Mississippi (last visited Jan. 22, 2013).
189 Id.
190 Shepherd & Netz, supra note 176, at 74. R
191 M. Jason Akers, The Big Black River Question: Suitable Site or Suited for Trouble?, 4
GAMING L. REV. 148 (2000).
192 Mary Perez, Rotate Black Coming Back with Bigger Plans for Harbor Town, SUN HER-
ALD (May 10, 2012), http://www.sunherald.com/2012/05/10/3938187/rotate-black-coming-
back-with.html.
193 THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 553. R
194 Id. at 559.
195 THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 561-62. R
196 Interview with Jack Binion, supra note 59; see also THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 562. R
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entrepreneurs of Nevada determined that the industry was to be open and com-
petitive—there was to be no monopoly in Nevada.197
Today, the casinos of Nevada, especially those of Las Vegas are very
competitive. For example, Stephen Wynn, a major casino entrepreneur, stated
that the Las Vegas Strip was the essence of free enterprise.198 He had competed
openly and vigorously with other casino owners such as Sheldon Adelson,
owner of the Venetian. In an interview, Wynn said, “He would offer a room
deal, then I would have to offer a better deal, he would match me and offer
better odds on a game, and I would have to follow—it was cut throat, we were
at each other’s jugulars—AND I LOVED IT!”199 According to Wynn, this
competition was wonderful for the players because they received the best deals
and the best customer service.200
The concerns of casino monopolies were raised before. For instance, the
federal anti-trust authorities started actions against Howard Hughes because he
was buying up properties on the Las Vegas Strip in the 1960s.201 After he
purchased seven casinos, they suggested that he own no more because he
would be controlling too much of the casino activity.202 Robert Maheu, aide to
Hughes, found this ironic because he had arranged with federal officials for
Hughes to buy Las Vegas Strip properties to end the influence of organized
crime interests in Las Vegas.203 Wynn was upset in 2004 when the MGM
Mirage corporation purchased the Mandalay Resort Group (which had merged
with Circus Circus casino properties), which would give it control over 50% of
the rooms on the Strip and 70% of the non-gaming entertainment operations.204
While that purchase came to be, both Adelson and Wynn continued their
growth activities on the Strip and successfully competed against M.G.M.
operations.205
An example of competition off the Strip illustrates Las Vegas gaming
activity. There is a ring of three major casinos in the southern urban core of Las
Vegas: the Green Valley Ranch (Constructed in 2001), the South Point (Built in
2005 as the South Coast, purchased by Michael Gaughn, and renamed South
Point in 2006), and the “M” Resort (2009).206 Each location appeals to gaming
patrons living in Henderson, the largest suburban city in the Las Vegas metro-
politan area, and the second largest city in Nevada.207 The three are very com-
petitive, especially being within a fifteen minute drive of one another.208 They
197 Interview with Jack Binion, supra note 59; see also THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 562. R
198 Interview with Stephen Wynn, CEO, Wynn Resorts Ltd., in Las Vegas, Nev. (Sept. 21,
2004).
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 THOMPSON, supra note 24. R
202 Id.
203 Interview with Robert Maheu, Chief Aide to Howard Hughes, in Las Vegas, Nev. (June
7, 2007).
204 Interview with Stephen Wynn, supra note 198. R
205 See THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 565. R
206 Id.
207 Interview with Bradley Wimmer, Professor of Econ., Univ. of Nev., Las Vegas, in Las
Vegas, Nev. (Mar. 21, 2012).
208 Id.
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market their facilities primarily to local residents, while their hotels and restau-
rants appeal to tourists, and each has a sports book.209
The South Point’s sports book first allowed patrons to place bets on win-
ners and on the total points for a game during the half-time of every game.210
The Green Valley Ranch took notice, but by the time they changed their rules
and allowed half-time betting on each basketball game, the “M” had opened its
sports book operated by Cantor Gaming.211 The “M” offered both half-time
bets as well as bets on game outcomes and total points scored during any time-
out throughout the entire game for all games.212 This only lasted for a short
duration because the Green Valley Ranch and the South Point adjusted to tak-
ing bets on game outcomes during timeouts throughout the course of the
games. These changes gave the player more in terms of gaming product and
gaming enjoyment.213 However, they came with a cost to the properties
because each had to hire more staff to analyze games through their entirety,
exposing the staff to greater dangers of making mistakes, or simply being less
skilled in game analysis than the best gamblers.214 Therefore, the “best” gam-
blers started coming to the these casinos because major sports books on the Las
Vegas Strip were not willing to take the risks and lower profits realized by the
Green Valley Ranch, the South Point, and the “M” Resort.215
J. New Jersey: The Open Market Experiences the Power of a Monopoly
New Jersey casinos, established by a vote of the people in 1976 and subse-
quent legislation passed in 1977,216 are structured for free and open competi-
tion. However, the casinos must be constructed within the boundaries of
Atlantic City.217 The high price of land and construction costs in Atlantic City,
along with a requirement for having 500 hotel rooms, renders the local casino
industry an oligopoly of 12 properties.218 Casinos are permitted to have up to
60,000 square feet of gaming space in a 500-room hotel.219 If a casino wants
more gaming space, it may have an additional 10,000 square feet of gaming
space for each additional 100 rooms.220
The New Jersey gaming law prescribes specific rules for each game that is
played. The rules set minimum and maximum bets made for each game.221 The
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 Casino Control Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12 (West 2011).
217 Nicholas Casiello & Marie Jones, New Jersey, in INTERNATIONAL CASINO LAW, supra
note 41, at 121; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-1 (West 2011). R
218 THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 573; for the effects of the regulation, see VICKI ABT ET R
AL., THE BUSINESS OF RISK: COMMERCIAL GAMBLING IN MAINSTREAM AMERICA 145-47
(1985); for an historical overview of New Jersey gaming, see GEORGE STERNLIEB & JAMES
W. HUGHES, THE ATLANTIC CITY GAMBLE 9-13 (1983).
219 Casiello & Jones, supra note 217, at 132; THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 575. R
220 Casiello & Jones, supra note 217, at 132; THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 575. R
221 Casiello & Jones, supra note 217, at 123. R
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government also placed inspectors in each casino during times of play—which
was originally 18-20 hours a day, but is now 24 hours a day.222 This require-
ment for inspectors was dropped in 2011.223 The license application process is
quite costly and labor intensive. New Jersey affirmed that its casinos were the
most strictly observed and regulated in the world.224 The state set out stringent
requirements covering even the de´cor and color combinations inside the
casinos.225
While New Jersey wanted to have such strict regulations, reality struck the
regulators with a vengeance in 1978 as the license application process was
opened.226 Only one company stepped forth seeking to be licensed: Resorts
International (“Resorts”). The New Jersey authorities promised very tight regu-
lations that would prevent “bad people” from becoming casino operators.
Indeed, as he signed the 1977 legislation, Governor Brendan Byrne had loudly
shouted out to a virtual audience of organized crime mobsters—“Keep your
filthy hands out of Atlantic City and keep the hell out of our state!”227 How-
ever, government authorities had also promised that the new casinos would
bring vitally needed jobs, urban renewal, and considerable tax revenues.228 To
uphold these promises, Atlantic City would need many casinos, but in early
1978, only one applicant, Resorts, stood in line to get a license.229
Resorts was the largest financial donor to the referendum campaign that
won voter approval in 1976.230 However, the newly created Division of Gam-
ing Enforcement (“DGE”) in the New Jersey attorney general’s office discov-
ered issues when investigating Resorts. Close associates of the company had
ties to organized crime and the company exhibited many serious defects in its
casino operations in the Bahamas.231 Moreover, the company was notorious for
bribing government officials in the Bahamas.232 The DGE recommended that
the final decision-maker on licensing—the New Jersey Casino Control Com-
mission (NJCCC)—deny the license application.233
The NJCCC had a dilemma. The NJCCC could choose the squeaky clean
path and deny the license, which would indefinitely postpone job-creation in
gaming and the collection of tax revenues. Alternatively, it could fold to reality
and grant a license to a party recognized as an industry “bad actor.” The
NJCCC tried to follow a middle path. It granted Resorts a temporary, six-month
222 Id. at 132.
223 115 Atlantic City Inspectors Jobs Being Eliminated, NJ.COM, Feb. 3, 2011, http://www.
vnj.com/atlantic/index.ssf/2011/02/115_atlantic_city_casino_inspectors_jobs_being_elimi-
nated.html.
224 STERNLIEB & HUGHES, supra note 218, at 59-61. R
225 Interview by Michael Aron with Richard J. Codey, Governor of N.J., in West Orange,
N.J. (Mar. 23, 2010), available at http://governors.rutgers.edu/interview_forum/documents/
Codey-interview.pdf.
226 STERNLIEB & HUGHES, supra note 218, at 65-66. R
227 GIGI MAHON, THE COMPANY THAT BOUGHT THE BOARDWALK 8 (1980).
228 STERNLIEB & HUGHES, supra note 218, at 2. R
229 Id. at 66; THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 575-76. R
230 STERNLIEB & HUGHES, supra note 218, at 52; DOMBRINK & THOMPSON, supra note 39, R
at 37.
231 Id.
232 See MAHON, supra note 227, at 80; THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 575-76. R
233 THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 576. R
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license.234 After receiving the license, Resorts finished remodeling an old hotel
as a casino. Resorts bought equipment, and hired staff.235 For six months it
operated as a casino gaming monopoly in the eastern two-thirds of America.
During those six months it made a killing, but it did not clean up its corporate
act.236 Resorts offered abysmal customer service and sought to raise game lim-
its, skirting the regulations wherever possible.237 It also set payout percentages
at the lowest levels allowed. The DGE discovered Resorts had been violating
regulations on a constant basis. Six months lapsed, and the DGE recommended
that a permanent or continuing license be denied to Resorts.238
On the other hand, Resorts had hired four thousand workers, and it paid
millions of dollars to the state in gaming taxes.239 The legislature had to calcu-
late future tax revenue into the state budget. The state had money, but it did not
have companies seeking a gaming license.240 The NJCCC only had Resorts. As
such, it gave Resorts a permanent license.241 For another eight months, Resorts
operated its casino as a monopoly. Its profits were phenomenal.242
K. Pennsylvania: Just Make it Bigger
In 2003, the Pennsylvania legislature studied the possibility of authorizing
slot machine casinos.243 This involved a study244 of slot machine revenues and
the residence of players in New Jersey and Delaware. It also involved deter-
mining where revenues would go. The study revealed that most of the players
were Pennsylvania residents. It also revealed that revenues mostly went to out-
of-state casino owners, slot machine suppliers in Nevada, and other suppliers—
some in and some out of Pennsylvania.245 The study found that gaming taxes
would go to Washington, D.C. and Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.246 The conclu-
sion was that even if Pennsylvania could collect a good share of the money
going to New Jersey and Delaware casinos, more money would leave Penn-
sylvania than come into Pennsylvania as a result of having the machines.247
234 See STERNLIEB & HUGHES, supra note 218, at 66; see MAHON, supra note 227, at 157; R
RICHARD LEHNE, CASINO POLICY 91 (1986).
235 STERNLIEB & HUGHES, supra note 218, at 66. R
236 STERNLIEB & HUGHES, supra note 218 at 66-68; MAHON, supra note 227, at 177. R
237 STERNLIEB & HUGHES, supra note 218 at 66-68; MAHON, supra note 227, at 177. R
238 THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 576. R
239 STERNLIEB & HUGHES, supra note 218, at 67. For more about New Jersey during this R
time, see generally MAHON, supra note 227, at 203-16, 226-40. R
240 STERNLIEB & HUGHES, supra note 218, at 68; LEHNE, supra note 234, at 93. R
241 THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 576; LEHNE, supra note 234, at 93. R
242 See STERNLIEB AND HUGHES, supra note 218, at 106-07. R
243 THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 584-86. R
244 As part of the study, coauthor William N. Thompson was engaged by an anti-casino
lobby group to examine potential revenues and economic impacts for a proposed project to
have 35,000 slot machines at fourteen separate (and monopoly) locations around
Pennsylvania.
245 William N. Thompson, Address at Pennsylvania General Assembly Finance Commit-
tees: Analysis of Revenue Potential from a Proposal for Machine Gambling in Pennsylvania,
Aug. 18, 2003, (on file with author).
246 Id.
247 Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVG\4-1\NVG103.txt unknown Seq: 23 30-APR-13 11:53
Spring 2013] SHOULD CASINOS EXIST AS MONOPOLIES 61
A month after the study, the researcher248 received a call from the gover-
nor’s office. The governor supported the idea of having the casinos and his staff
wanted the researcher’s opinion as to whether Pennsylvania could retrieve over
one billion dollars in taxation if the state had 35,000 machines. The researcher
agreed to analyze this single factor with the understanding that standing alone
this would not be a conclusion in favor of or against casino.249 Assuming a tax
of 33 1/3%, the answer was “yes.”250 A machine could make $90,000, meaning
that it would produce $30,000 a year in state taxes. With 35,000 machines, this
would bring in $1,050,000,000 in taxes.251 The governor was happy with this
response and told his legislative colleagues to revise the bill.252 The legislation
was passed.253 On July 5, 2004, the governor signed the bill authorizing four-
teen casinos, seven at horse race tracks and seven “free standing.” Each casino
could have up to 5000 slot machines, with a maximum of 60,000 machines in
the state.254 The first casinos opened in 2006. By 2009, the state was realizing
over $1.3 billion in casinos taxes, with a third more going to local govern-
ments.255 In 2010, the state began allowing the casinos to have table games.256
Overall, one thing motivated state activity on gaming: tax revenue.257
L. Ohio: A Monopoly Created by The Monopolists258
In 2009, Ohio voters approved four monopoly casinos for Toledo, Cleve-
land, Columbus, and Cincinnati.259 The Cincinnati casino shares its local mar-
ket with three casino boats under Indiana jurisdiction. Somehow, the sponsors
of the Ohio vote were able to sneak the details of their proposal by the voters
with a promise of economic benefits such as jobs and taxes. Until the votes
were counted, it went almost unnoticed that the proposition determined who
would own the casinos. The proposition specified the exact parcels of land
upon which the casinos were to be built, and these parcels already had owners.
One party, the owner of sports teams in Cleveland, was thereby given owner-
ship of two of the casinos.260 Post-vote protests led to legislative approval of
casinos at each of seven horse race tracks in the state. The first casino opened
in May 2012 in Cleveland.261
248 The researcher tasked with assisting the governor was coauthor William N. Thompson.
249 Id.
250 Unpublished Paper from William N. Thompson to Ed Rendell, Governor of Penn. (July
2003) (on file with author).
251 Id. 
252 See William N. Thompson, Gambling Taxes: The Philosophy, The Constitution, and
Horizontal Equity, 17 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 389, 397 (2010).
253 Pennsylvania Racehorse Development and Gambling Act 4 PA. CONS. STAT. §1101
(2004).
254 4 PA CONS. STAT. §1201 (2010); see Thompson, supra note 252, at 585. R
255 See Thompson, supra note 252. R
256 Id.
257 Id.
258 Not considered in analysis, as the casinos are just beginning to open in mid-2012.
259 THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 581-82. R
260 Id.
261 Jen Steer & Josh Boose, Horseshoe Casino Cleveland Officially Opens, Lines of People
File in and Give positive Reviews, NEWSNET5.COM (May 14, 2012), http://www.newsnet5.
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M. South Dakota: Reviving Wild Bill Hickok
The town of Deadwood, South Dakota gained a “Wild West” reputation in
the nineteenth century. It was noted for offering “sin” opportunities for cow-
boys and fortune-seeking miners.262 Wild Bill Hickok was shot in the back
during a poker game in 1876.263 In the twentieth century, Deadwood exhibited
its historical roots, appealing to tourists. Thus, casinos were proposed as an
attempt to win more tourist trade. However, South Dakota voters defeated a
casino vote in 1982.264 The tourist activity took a major hit after a fire
destroyed much of the downtown area in 1987.265 City fathers responded by
sponsoring another casino referendum in 1988.266 This time South Dakota vot-
ers approved it, and in 1989, after local voters gave a second approval, casinos
opened.267 Now, there are 30 small gaming halls offering blackjack, poker, and
slot machines.268 Each casino is limited to 30 slot machines or table gaming
seats. Originally, bets were limited to $5, but there is now a $100 bet limit.269
The state imposes an 8% gaming tax, with the money going to gaming regula-
tion and tourism development for the Black Hills region.270 Other areas of
South Dakota have eight Native American casinos, while bars, restaurants, and
hotels across the state are permitted to have a limited number of slot
machines.271
N. West Virginia: From Racino to Casino
The West Virginia legislature authorized an experimental installation of
video gaming machines—keno machines, poker machines, and slot machines—
at the Mountaineer horse racing track beginning on June 9, 1990.272 At first,
only seventy machines were installed.273 That number grew to 400 in 1994,
with most of them being keno machines.274 The first machines had payouts of
88.6 percent.275 During a three-year experimental period, the lottery agreed not
to put machines in other locations.276 Now machines are at the three other
tracks: Charles Town, Wheeling Island, and Tri-State, with the latter two being
com/dpp/news/local_news/cleveland_metro/horseshoe-casino-cleveland-officially-opens-
lines-of-people-file-in.
262 THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 589. R
263 Id.; Anthony Cabot, South Dakota, in INTERNATIONAL CASINO LAW, supra note 41, at R
138.
264 THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 589; Cabot, supra note 263, at 138. R
265 THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 590; Cabot, supra note 263, at 138. R
266 THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 589; Cabot, supra note 263, at 138. R
267 THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 589; Cabot, supra note 263, at 138. R
268 See generally, South Dakota, WORLD CASINO DIRECTORY, http://www.worldcasino
directory.com/south-dakota/casino-list (last visited Jan. 18, 2013); see generally also CASINO
CITY’S GAMING BUSINESS DIRECTORY (2010).
269 THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 590; Cabot, supra note 263, at 138. R
270 THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 590. R
271 See id. at 589-90.
272 Id. at 595; William N. Thompson, Inside Straight: Racinos and the Public Interest, 3
GAMING L. REV. 283, 283 (1999).
273 Thompson, supra note 272. R
274 Id.
275 Id. 
276 Id.
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dog tracks.277 The tracks keep 70 percent of the revenues and 30 percent goes
to the state.278 There are now over eleven thousand machines at the tracks.279
Lottery machines are also permitted in over a thousand bars and taverns.280 In
2007, in response to the expansion of gaming in Pennsylvania, the state legisla-
ture approved a measure allowing casino table games at the four tracks if they
received local voter approval.281 The approvals were secured, and four full
casinos operate in the state.282
VI. CLASSIFYING AND ORDERING AMERICAN STATE VENUES
The following table classifies the 13 American jurisdictions from the most
monopolistic to the most competitive. These classifications are determined by
the number of casinos permitted, their locations vis-a`-vis one another, and
whether new casinos may seek licenses.
At the top of the table are the seven casino jurisdictions that have limited
the number of casinos. They are arranged by the number of casinos permitted
and their geographical spread.
TABLE 3: THE ORDER OF STATES—MOST MONOPOLISTIC TO MOST OPEN283
Closed Number of Casinos
West Virginia 4 monopoly casinos
Pennsylvania 14 monopoly and oligopolistic casinos
Michigan 3 oligopolistic casinos
Illinois 10 monopoly and oligopolistic casinos
Indiana 13 monopoly and oligopolistic casinos
Missouri 13 monopoly and oligopolistic casinos
Louisiana 16 monopoly and oligopolistic casinos
Unlimited Number of Casinos
Iowa 17 monopoly and oligopolistic casinos
New Jersey 13 limited location-competitive casinos
South Dakota 30 limited location-competitive casinos
Colorado 40 limited location-competitive casinos
Mississippi 30 competitive casinos with some location limits
Nevada 300+ competitive casinos
277 THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 595. R
278 Thompson, supra note 272. R
279 Id.
280 THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 595. R
281 W. VA. CODE § 29-22C-7 (2007).
282 Thompson, supra note 24, at 596. R
283 See entries in THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 524-95. R
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VII. MEASURE OF IMPACTS OF MONOPOLY ON INDUSTRY OUTPUTS
Literature suggests that monopolies’ major impacts are upon pricing and
providing quality services to customers. The general theory is that a monopoly
structure will burden the customer with artificially higher prices and will lower
the quality of goods and services.284 It is difficult to measure these factors in
relation to the casino industry because there are not many price points on a
casino gaming floor that can be accurately assessed across large numbers of
casinos. Players do not pay a set fee to play games. And while the games
offered return benefits to the player in terms of wins, most games are played
with the same rules and odds over many casinos. Where differences in odds
exist, they are not such that they can be easily determined and analyzed. Differ-
ences are also as likely to be found within the same casinos as to be found
across several. Ergo, a blackjack game may offer slightly different rules if the
game is for low stakes ($5) as opposed to high stakes ($100 and over), or if it is
dealt from a shoe, an automatic card shuffler, or from a single deck. Roulette
wheels may offer a house advantage of a single zero, or they may offer double
zeros. Yet, in America, wheels with single zeros are extremely rare so compari-
sons are not fruitful. Within some foreign casinos, wheels of both types may
appear on the same gaming floor.285
There is one measure that can be used to assess the cost of a gambling
product.
Slot machines make random payouts to players. However, the odds that
exist over long terms of play are amazingly consistent for specific casinos and
jurisdictions. They are also reported in official records. Of the thirteen states,
only Michigan does not report payoff percentages. While the payouts of five
cent, twenty-five cent, dollar, and other machines vary, casinos typically report
the payouts of each machine denomination and the rates for all machines
together. Of the thirteen casino states in this analysis, four—Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, and Missouri—report payout percentages for individual casinos.286
These four and eight others make reports for all machines in the jurisdiction.
A. Monopolies and Slot Machine Payouts
First, the impact of a monopoly structure will be tested with the following
hypothesis: “monopolistic casinos will have lower slot machine payout percent-
ages than will open competitive structures.” The below table is organized
beginning with the most closed and monopolistic jurisdictions to the most com-
petitive and open jurisdictions. A closed jurisdiction is one in which no more
casinos will be allowed.287
284 SAMUELSON, supra note 1. R
285 Personal observation of coauthor Thompson during visit to Casino St. Vincent, Italy,
July 18, 1987.
286 See Slot Machine Payback Statistics, AMERICAN CASINO GUIDE, http://www.american
casinoguide.com/slot-machine-payback-statistics.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2013).
287 Id.
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TABLE 4. MONOPOLY STRUCTURES AND PRICING: SLOT MACHINE
PAYOFF PERCENTAGES
Closed States Slot Machine Payoff (median casino)
West Virginia 89.78%
Pennsylvania 90.76%
Michigan ——
Illinois 91.58%
Indiana 91.28%
Missouri 90.85%
Louisiana 90.90%
All Closed States (minus MI) 90.88%
Open States Slot Machine Payoff (median casino)
Iowa 90.86%
New Jersey 91.28%
South Dakota 90.99%
Colorado 92.32%
Mississippi 92.56%
Nevada 93.80%
All Open States 91.80%
Overall Median 91.09%
The hypothesis presented is proven. Monopoly casinos have a tendency to
suppress slot machine payouts, raising the price of gaming for players. Open
competitive jurisdictions offer higher payouts, ergo better prices for the players.
B. Service Quality Attributes
As mentioned above, it is difficult to find price points on casino floors, at
least prices that can be compiled for comparisons among large numbers of casi-
nos. However, there are attributes of casino operations that may have a major
impact on the quality of service and the value that casinos add to their commu-
nities and their player base. Data was collected on several of these attributes,
namely, job numbers, number of hotel rooms, convention space, number of
restaurants, and number of entertainment venues in casinos.288
For each attribute, casino revenues were analyzed to obtain the amount of
casino revenue associated with one casino job, one hotel room, one square foot
of convention space, one restaurant, and one entertainment venue in the
288 The data is utilized in a previous article: William N. Thompson, Casino Taxes - Accentu-
ating the Negative, 15 GAMING L. REV. & ECON. 599, 600 (2011); Sources of data include:
AMERICAN GAMING ASSOCIATION, STATE OF THE STATES (2010), and CASINO CITY’S NORTH
AMERICAN GAMING ALMANAC (Steve Bloom & Michael Opton eds., 2012); CASINO CITY’S
GAMING BUSINESS DIRECTORY (Winter 2012).
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casino.289 The data was accumulated for each state and for individual casinos in
four selected states. The data is presented in tables 5a, 5b and 6. The data is
used to test the hypothesis that open competitive casinos will offer better ser-
vice quality than closed monopolistic casinos.290
TABLE 5A  CASINO REVENUES, JOBS AND AMENITIES (2009)
CLOSED STATES291
Total Convention Entertainment
State Revenue Calculation Jobs Hotel Rooms Space Restaurants Venues
WV $906m Total Units 4,688 663 37,800 29 10
Revenue per $193,171 $1,365,852 $23,957 $31,241,379 $90,559,000
Unit
PA $3.549b Total Units 14,925 488 38,500 62 7
Revenue per $237,453 $7,262,295 $92,052 $57,161,290 $506,285,710
Unit
MI $1.339b Total Units 8,122 800 32,735 13 10
Revenue per $164,861 $1,673,750 $40,904 $103,000,000 $133,900,000
Unit
IL $1.429b Total Units 7,083 1,116 50,100 40 13
Revenue per $201,751 $1,280,466 $28,523 $35,725,000 $109,923,070
Unit
IN $2.799b Total Units 15,857 4,028 179,050 70 25
Revenue per $176,515 $694,886 $15,633 $39,985,714 $111,960,000
Unit
MO $1.730b Total Units 10,961 2,567 184,550 57 24
Revenue per $157,832 $673,938 $9,374 $30,350,877 $72,883,333
Unit
LA $2.456b Total Units 17,610 4,523 119,940 74 19
Revenue per $139,466 $543,002 $20,477 $33,189,189 $129,263,150
Unit
Total $14.208b Total Units 79,246 14,185 642,675 345 108
Revenue per $179,290 $1,001,621 $22,108 $41,182,608 $131,555,556
Unit
289 Id. 
290 Id.
291 Id. The figures on each table have been taken from sources, formulated and calculations
set forth made by the coauthors.
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TABLE 5B CASINO REVENUES, JOBS AND AMENITIES (2009) OPEN STATES292
Total Hotel Convention Entertainment
State Revenue Calculation Jobs Rooms Space Restaurants Venues
IA $1.381b Total Units 9,241 1,627 101,320 55 23
Revenue per $149,443 $848,801 $13,630 $29,109,090 $60,043,478
Unit
NJ $3.943b Total Units 36,377 16,406 768,669 151 57
Revenue per $108,392 $240,339 $5,130 $26,112,582 $69,175,438
Unit
SD $102m Total Units 1,765 1,148 29,850 44 2
Revenue per $57,734 $88,763 $3,414 $2,315,909 $50,950,000
Unit
CO $735m Total Units 8,821 1,392 61,928 75 10
Revenue per $83,277 $527,723 $11,862 $9,794,533 $73,459,000
Unit
MS $2.465b Total Units 25,739 12,936 346,875 130 47
Revenue per $95,769 $190,554 $7,160 $18,961,538 $52,446,808
Unit
NV $10.393b Total Units 177,397 148,975 11,683,792 1,283 375
Revenue per $58,586 $69,763 $890 $8,100,546 $27,714,666
Unit
Total $19.019b Total Units 259,340 182,484 12,992,434 1,738 514
Revenue per $73,336 $104,223 $1,464 $10,943,037 $37,001,945
Unit
Total $8.626b Total Units 81,943 33,509 1,308,642 455 139
Without NV
Revenue per $105,268 $257,423 $6,592 $18,958,241 $62,057,553
Unit
The information in Tables 5a and 5b suggests confirmation of the hypoth-
esis presented. Data consistently reveals that the open market states offer more
employees and more amenities to their guests. While the hypothesis may be
confirmed, the persistence of an outside variable must be mentioned. The taxa-
tion element will be discussed with the same data set in a previous study cited
above.293 The monopoly states have higher gaming tax rates, and these are also
associated with lower job numbers, as well as lower levels of amenities.
The six “closed” states have 79,610 jobs in their casinos. With gaming
revenues of $14.2 billion dollars a year (2009), it takes $179,290 in gaming
revenue to produce one job. However, the seven states with open casino com-
petition have 259,340 jobs produced by revenues of $19.0 billion, which is only
$73,336 for each job. For each dollar spent by gamers, and for each single
gamer, there are more employees in open market states. This impacts quality.
Recently, the state of New Jersey took a license from one of the Atlantic
City casinos.294 There was a litany of abuses, which contributed to the casino’s
disqualification. However, one of the bigger abuses was the casino’s wholesale
292 Id.
293 Thompson, supra note 288. R
294 See Press Release, New Jersey Casino Control Comm’n, Commission Denies License
Renewal for Tropicana; Trustee Takes Control Immediately (Dec. 12, 2007), available at
http://www.nj.gov/casinos/news/archive/pdf/immediatereleasetropicana.pdf; Howard Stutz,
Tropicana Denied by N.J. Panel, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Dec. 13, 2007, at 1D.
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employee layoffs.295 In turn, the casino received many complaints about cus-
tomer service and established a record of having unclean and unhealthy facili-
ties.296 Job numbers make a difference.
Because casino gaming in Nevada is much larger than any other U.S.
state, all analysis must carefully consider the fact. Therefore, one could con-
sider just the attributes of five open states in tables 5a and 5b, excluding
Nevada. However, when this is done, the conclusions do not change, and the
hypothesis remains confirmed.
Casino amenities off the gaming floor have the capacity to add value to
the casino community and to increase its base of casino players. Hotel rooms,
convention facilities, restaurants, and entertainment venues are attractive to a
community. The seven closed states have 14,185 rooms, or one room for each
$1,001,621 in gaming revenue. The six open states have 182,484 hotel rooms,
or one room for each $104,223. Taking Nevada out of the equation, the five
other open states produce one room for $257,423.
One square foot of convention space corresponds to $22,108 of casino
revenue in the seven closed states, but only $1,464 in the six open states. Not
including Nevada, the revenue for each square foot of space is $6,592 in the
five open states. One restaurant in the closed states, which had a total of 345
restaurants, was tied to $41,182,608 in gaming revenue. The gaming revenue
was only $10,943,037 for each of the 1,738 restaurants in the six open states.
Not including Nevada, the revenue for each restaurant is $18,958,241 in the
five open states.
There were 108 entertainment venues in the six closed casino states. Each
came was tied to $131,555,556 in gaming revenue. In the six open states, the
gaming revenue is $37,001,945 for each of 514 entertainment venues; without
Nevada, it is $62,057,553 for each of 139 entertainment facilities in the five
open states.
The data in the tables above offers confirmation of the two tested hypothe-
ses. Open competition in the casino industry results in enhanced values for
customers, including lower prices, more amenities, and better quality service.
However, there are some caution flags with the casinos in four mid-western
states.
VIII. PRICE POINTS IN MONOPOLISTIC CASINOS IN FOUR SELECTED STATES
Further analysis takes one to four states, all of which are monopolistic-
oligopolistic jurisdictions. Three states—Illinois, Indiana, and Missouri—are
closed states, while the other—Iowa—may be open to new licenses. The indi-
vidual casinos in these states (with two exceptions for new casinos) provide
information on their slot machine payoffs and the service quality. Of the 51
casinos open in 2009, 20 were monopoly facilities because no other casino was
295 Stutz, supra note 294. R
296 Id.
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within 50 miles.297 Thirty-one were in oligopolistic settings because there were
competing casinos within fifty miles.298
With the same two hypotheses for these sets of casinos, one should expect
that the monopolistic set of 20 casinos will have higher slot prices, meaning
lower payout percentages to the players, and lower service quality than top
competitive casinos.
The data does not support the hypotheses. Slot machine payoff percent-
ages were not distinguishable—the 20 monopoly casinos had a median slot
payoff percentage of 91.08%, while that of the 31 competitive casinos was
91.07%.
Also, the evidence on the service quality was directly contrary to the
hypothesis. Jobs in monopoly casinos came with gaming revenues of $124,900,
but in the competitive states, $173,200. Hotel rooms: monopoly unit price
$591,300; with competitive casinos, $828,500. Convention space: monopoly
unit price $6.6 per square foot; competitive casinos, $16.2 per square foot. The
monopoly casinos had $22,448 in gaming revenue for each restaurant, and
$49,517 for each entertainment venue. The competitive casinos had $31,760 for
each restaurant, and $103,223 for each entertainment venue.
However, before rejecting the hypothesis, one might consider another
explanation. All of these casinos are in states with monopolistic and oligopolis-
tic casino industry structures. While Iowa could allow new casinos, it is
unlikely to do so in the short run. The casinos can expect artificial market
stability not present in the other open states. Perhaps in these states, monopoly
casinos experience greater levels of profits and use these to hire extra staff and
invest in amenities, which improve service quality. However, the evidence sug-
gests this spread of factors only in the selected states and not across all casino
states where opposite findings are in evidence.
The following table analyzes data for casinos located in Iowa, Illinois,
Indiana, and Missouri. There are a total of 51 casinos—20 are “monopoly”
casinos and 31 are “competitive” casinos. A “monopoly” casino is the only
casino within 50 miles. A “competitive” casino is a casino located within 50
miles of another casino.
297 The casino locations were identified on maps by the coauthors. Distances between casi-
nos were determined by hand calculations using map legends and Google Maps.
298 Id.
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TABLE 6. PRICE AND SERVICE FACTORS OF INDIVIDUAL CASINOS—IN
MONOPOLY SETTINGS AND IN COMPETITIVE SETTINGS IN
SELECTED STATES299
Monopoly (20) Competitive (31)
Total Revenue $1.7 billion $5.4 billion
Total Revenue p/Unit Total Revenue p/Unit
Calculation Units (thousands) Units (thousands)
Jobs 13,469 $124.9 30,987 $173.2
Hotel Rooms 2,847 $591.3 6,479 $828.5
Convention Space 256,357 $6.6/sq. ft. 332,098 $16.2/sq. ft.
Restaurants 75 $22,448.0 169 $31,760.9
Entertainment Venues 34 $49,517.6 52 $103,223.1
Slot Payoffs* 91.08% — 91.07% —
*Slot payoffs are collective medians
IX. A SUMMARY NOTE: FUTURE RESEARCH
The data presented on tables 4, 5a, and 5b support the hypotheses that
monopoly-state casinos will offer higher prices for their products, and offer
fewer amenities. This gives the customers fewer benefits overall. However, this
is not a definitive report, but rather exploratory and preliminary suggestion.
The findings in table 6 do not definitively support or reject the hypotheses.
Casino legalizations may have reached a “tipping point” and many new states
will soon be setting forth industry structures for their casinos. More research
could be valuable to attain definitive findings. Replications of the approaches
taken here would be valuable, as would cross-jurisdiction studies using sample
surveys of many players regarding their perceptions of service quality in casi-
nos they have visited.
X. PARTING DISCUSSION: OF ALL INDUSTRIES, WHY SHOULD CASINOS
BE MONOPOLIES?
Literature suggests that some industries are appropriately monopoly enter-
prises. Do casinos fit the bill as part of such industries? This section will
examine five arguments in support of monopolies.
First, monopolies are considered to be appropriate when authorities
believe that the product of the monopoly is critical for society and that the
supplier of the product may not be successful if confronted with vigorous com-
petition. For example, because electric power is vital, power producers should
be monopolies. The same may be true for utilities producing drinking water and
services for cleaning wastewater.
299 The data is utilized in a previous article: William N. Thompson, Casino Taxes -
Accentuating the Negative, 15 GAMING L. REV. & ECON. 599, 600 (2011); Sources of data
include: AMERICAN GAMING ASSOCIATION, STATE OF THE STATES (2010), and CASINO
CITY’S NORTH AMERICAN GAMING ALMANAC (Steve Bloom & Michael Opton eds., 2012);
CASINO CITY’S GAMING BUSINESS DIRECTORY (Winter 2012).
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However, casino gambling simply is not a vital product or service. At best,
it is a recreational service that may result in economic benefits. At its worst, it
can become addictive and harmful to the individuals involved in gambling and
to the general society. No reasonable assessment would suggest that casino
gambling institutions need the special protection of monopoly status because
they fulfill such a critical need for society.
One anomaly occurs in Sweden, where the government has a monopoly
over sales of alcoholic beverages, limiting consumption, and keeping prices
high. They do this with notion of protecting the public.300 Sweden’s special
protection for alcoholic beverage sales involves limited consumption. Govern-
ments and private casino monopoly owners do the opposite. They seek to raise
levels of consumption in order to realize higher profits and taxation levels.
Second, monopolies are supported by the notion that certain businesses
need especially large capital investment.301 Accordingly, they find that inves-
tors are reluctant to furnish capital funds without assurance that the businesses
will achieve a high profit level—levels that only monopoly businesses can
achieve. Also, if competitive enterprises offer the same product, there will be
major inefficiencies with duplicate investments such as multiple telephone
poles on the same street, or duplicate sets of train tracks over the same path-
ways. Certain modern casinos may carry costs approaching several billions of
dollars, but such high costs are not necessary to produce casino facilities in
some areas. Casinos historically were created as side rooms off other facilities.
Some gaming facilities are but temporary locations for playing card and dice
games. Moreover, the most extravagant casinos today—ones with investments
over a billion dollars each—are found in very competitive market places such
as Las Vegas, Atlantic City, Macau, and Singapore. Therefore, casinos do not
need monopoly protection in order to attract capital investment funds.
Third, the enhanced profits of the monopoly business structure may be
used to develop new innovative products that will be beneficial for society.302
While casinos are constantly tweaking their games with rule changes and
graphic appeals, the level of innovation in casinos is minimal. The games
played in casinos are very old and the types of equipment for the games (i.e.
roulette wheels, green felt tables, dice, and decks of cards, and even slot
machines) have been around for well over a century, or indeed many centu-
ries.303 Casinos do not sell products; they sell services. The innovation in their
service delivery is not capital-intensive. Most casino innovations have come
from suppliers who sell to all establishments or from the minds of entrepre-
neurs at competitive casinos.
Fourth, efficiency is one reason to support monopolies.304 One idea is that
many competitive establishments operate with the same customer base, but one
300 What is a Government Monopoly?, EHOW, http://www.ehow.com/about_5471337_gov-
ernment-monopoly.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2013).
301 DEWEY, supra note 3, at 50. R
302 Pau Klein, Monopoly Advantages and Disadvantages, PAUKLEIN.COM, www.pauklein.
com/monopoly/monopoly.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2013).
303 See generally, THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 239-88. R
304 For more analysis, see DEWEY, supra note 2, at 50, 66; STEPHEN J. K. WALTERS, ENTER- R
PRISE, GOVERNMENT, AND THE PUBLIC 218 (1993); see Sumner H. Slichter, In Defense of
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performs more effectively and with greater efficiency. As business costs are
reduced, casinos might reduce prices and expand their facilities. Competitors
are unable to meet the more efficient casino’s prices, losing their customers.
Thus, in a Darwinian fashion, the most efficient enterprise forces the others out
of business, and wins a monopoly position in the economy. However, this ratio-
nale for monopolies—to the most efficient go the spoils—cannot apply to the
casinos in this study. Monopoly casinos did not earn their monopoly standing.
Governments gave the casinos their monopoly standing. Some earned their
governmental gift through a competitive bidding process, but many were sim-
ply the sole qualified bidder for a casino license in a particular location.
Fifth, there is an argument that monopolies may exist if they are subject to
strict government regulations.305 Some may even suggest that monopolies are
good because they necessitate strict regulation. This rationale hardly fits the
casino industry. Strict gaming regulation was first applied to casinos in Nevada
in the 1950s, when the industry had already developed along the lines of open
competition. Atlantic City casinos were hailed as the most strictly regulated
even after a competitive number of licenses were granted.
Nevada, New Jersey, and Mississippi—all open and competitive jurisdic-
tions—instituted rules that casinos had to have a certain level of amenities,
such as a number of hotel rooms. Similarly, in New Orleans, a monopolistic
jurisdiction, the casinos could not have hotel rooms, sit-down restaurants, or
shows. Thus, the correlation between monopolies and strict regulation is
tenuous.
None of the rationales supporting a monopoly structure applies to casinos.
This should be re-explored with replication and other new research. It is incred-
ible that the American political system has invested millions of hours of judi-
cial and executive expertise and countless hours of legislative work on the
subject the monopoly business enterprise. Textbooks devoted to the area of
monopoly study and practice fill shelves in law libraries. Law journals devote a
myriad of pages to these questions and the almost endless cases. Yet, a cursory
review of the literature revealed no law texts or articles addressing these ques-
tions in the context of the casino industry. While American scholars and politi-
cal leaders fight over how many petroleum companies, cereal companies, steel
companies, or even baseball leagues there must be in our competitive society,
casinos may operate in any way that their lobbyists persuade legislators or vot-
ers to allow, sometimes without strict oversight. Thus, the topic of monopolies
in the American casino industry demands more attention.
Bigness in Business, in MONOPOLY POWER AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 13-18 (Edwin
Mansfield ed., 1974).
305 ADAMS, supra note 2, 488-92. R
